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1 Introduction
Few notions about economic policy in the U.S. command such wide-spread
acceptance as the idea that there are marked differences in tax policy be-
tween Democrats and Republicans. Indeed, if one were to point out that
Democrats favor high tax rates, while Republicans aim to lower them, many
might conclude that not much more than the obvious has been stated.
Rather than re-affirming the conventional wisdom about tax policy in
the U.S., however, this paper squarely challenges it. Employing state-level
data for the fiscal years 1988 to 2004, I test how well partisan models of eco-
nomic policy-making in the U.S. fit the actual record at the often neglected
sub-national level. The surprising conclusion that I reach is that there is
no substantively meaningful difference between states ruled by Republicans
vs. Democrats when it comes to revenue changes during the period under
study. The regression results predict at most a one-time partisan revenue
adjustment effect of $64.02, which translates into a 1.10% difference in the
average general fund revenue level over a four-year term.
As the results presented in this paper if not contradict, then at least
challenge a vast, well-entrenched literature, extensive robustness checks are
performed, and three different specifications of the dependent variable are
discussed and various sub-periods of the data examined. Throughout, the
main finding remains intact: There is no substantively meaningful evidence
in favor of the partisan view of tax policy that is such a prominent feature
of current thinking about economic policy in the U.S.
Section 2 of this paper reviews the central literature on state-level fiscal
policy. Section 3 outlines the empirical approach pursued and discusses
several important obstacles that have to be overcome in a sensible analysis
of state-level revenue patterns, showing how results based upon an analysis
of revenue data in levels can lead to invalid inferences. Section 4 focuses on
changes in revenue levels, shows that an OLS analysis is appropriate for this
data, and discusses the regression results in detail, while section 5 concludes.
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2 Earlier work
The determinants and effects of tax policy have been a topic of long-standing
interest in the U.S. and around the world. Not surprisingly, this general
interest is reflected in a vast scholarly literature on topics such as optimal
taxation and its counterpart, the distortionary effects of taxation. Indeed,
numerous textbooks have been written on these issues, too, and some of the
best nowadays also include an extensive coverage of political determinants of
tax levels. Yet, unlike in the case of the economic underpinnings of taxation,
whether these political aspects travel easily from one setting to another—
either across borders or to different, typically sub-national, levels within one
country—remains relatively unclear.
While a voluminous body of work exists that discusses federal-level tax
policy in the U.S., at the level of the 50 American states the literature on
the revenue effects of political factors is still in its infancy. However, at least
from the early 1990s on, several notable papers that focus on institutions
such as term limits and balanced-budget requirements have been published
in the leading journals in economics and political science, and I will briefly
sketch their main ideas and results below.
Bohn & Inman (1996) conduct a comprehensive study of the effects that
balanced-budget rules exert on the level of public deficits for a panel of
47 American states. Based on data for 1970-1991, they find that end-of-
the-year balance requirements influence the level of a state’s general fund
surplus positively. Importantly, spending cuts, not tax increases, are said to
give rise to this result. In his study of states’ reactions to “fiscal shocks” in
the early 1990s, Poterba (1994) also finds that such rules matter. However,
he attributes a much greater role to tax adjustments based on his data for
1988-1992, stating that “[b]oth the ordinary least squares and instrumental
variables results suggest that states react to unexpected deficits with real
changes in fiscal position. [...] Tax increases within the fiscal year make a
relatively small contribution to deficit reduction, but tax changes that take




Poterba (1994) also tests whether single-party rule, as opposed to divided
government, has any effect on adjustment patterns. He concludes that in
those states that have strict anti-deficit rules the two setups indeed lead
to different outcomes, with adjustment taking place more rapidly in states
that are under single-party control.2 Indeed, this result could be explained
by the fact that one would expect a gridlock over revenue vs. expenditure
changes with divided government. By contrast, it is troubling for the view
that under divided government the electorate has more difficulty attributing
blame for unpopular measures to one of the parties that effectively share
(some) power, which would lead one to expect that painful adjustments—
raising taxes and cutting spending in already troubled times—should be
easier to carry out under such circumstances.3 Apparently, balanced-budget
requirements, which are often part of a state’s constitution, insulate policy-
makers under unified government to a considerable extent from the wrath
of the electorate.
Electoral accountability, in turn, is one of the main foci of the paper by
Lowry et al. (1998). They conclude that accountability is indeed higher
under unified government, yet they also assert that Republicans are pun-
ished for an expansion of the size of state-level government activity, while
Democrats are rewarded for it.4 Niemi et al. (1995), on the other hand, find
that voters punish the incumbent party’s candidate for past tax increases,
regardless of party affiliation, a finding echoed by Kone & Winters (1993).
Besley & Case (1995) examine budget data for the 48 continental U.S.
states from 1950 to 1986. They find that Democratic incumbents faced with
a term limit on average tend to increase total taxes by $10 to $15 per year
in their last term in office, while their Republican colleagues leave the tax
burden unchanged. Moreover, “[a]n F–test rejects that, for Democratic gov-
ernors taken as a group, the regression coefficients on different years in the
2Krause (2000) shows for the federal level that the simple discrete distinction between
unified and divided government can usefully be extended by considering the (continuous)
degree of ideological fragmentation between the executive and the legislature. Data at
this level of detail is not available at the state-level, however.
3Powell & Whitten (1993). See also the discussion in Berry & Berry (1992, 1994) on
the politically most opportune moments for introducing new taxes or raising existing ones.
4To be more exact, Lowry et al. (1998: 759) state that Democratic governors may be
rewarded for small increases in a state’s budget.
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electoral cycle are identical for governors who may run again and for gover-
nors who cannot.”5 Clearly, both the notion that term limits will influence
incumbent governors’ behavior and that Republicans and Democrats behave
differently is vindicated by these results.6
The explanation that Besley & Case (1995: 786) offer for the different
taxation patterns is rather unconvincing, however: “Governors hold taxes
and expenditures low in their first term [...], and voters allow them a second
term. At that point the governors care less about putting in effort, result-
ing in increased taxes and spending.” Yet, this view leaves the difference in
behavior between Democratic and Republican officeholders unexplained, as
one is left to wonder why only Democrats but not Republicans give in to
demands for higher spending levels that under balanced-budget rules neces-
sarily accompany any revenue increase.
Alt and Lowry (2000) are the first who tried to quantify the difference
in the preferred scale of state-level general fund revenues and estimate that
Democrats aim for 50% higher revenues than Republicans.7 If their findings
are correct, one should observe sizable differences in aggregate revenue tra-
jectories under Democratic and Republican governors, as transitions in the
governor’s mansion from one party to another were quite frequent during
the period under study in this paper.
In a related article, Crain & Tollison (1993) have examined the impact of
legislative stability and executive term limits on the volatility of fiscal pol-
icy for the U.S. states from 1969–1989. They find sizable effects for a wide
range of political variables, including the legislature’s stability and guber-
natorial term limits. Most importantly in the present context, “the impact
of legislative stability on the volatility of taxes is 15 times the effect on the
volatility of spending. Approximately the same result holds for surpluses
and deficits; surpluses and deficits respond much more dramatically to the
expectation of legislative change than do expenditures.”8 Yet, as so often,
5Besley & Case (1995: 785)
6One point that is not fully captured by Besley & Case’s (1995) paper is that keeping
tax rates constant could also be interpreted as a “relative” cut in rates. There is a well-
known tendency for state-level governmental activity to continually expand in absolute
terms, and this pattern is also reflected at the level of the individual states.
7Alt & Lowry (2000: 1064)
8Crain & Tollison (1993: 157–158)
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a result pointing in the opposite direction can be found, too. Kneebone
& MacKenzie (2001) have studied the fiscal choices of Canadian provincial
governments using data for 1966–1997 and find that “partisan responses
are largely absent from revenues but appear more frequently in program
spending choices.”9
Overall, there is a near-consensus that it substantively matters whether
the conservative or liberal party (or coalition) rules, with higher expected
levels of taxation and revenue more generally under left-leaning govern-
ments, that divided government can attenuate these partisan effects, and
that term limits might also play a role in the formulation and implemen-
tation of revenue policies. Consequently, the econometric analysis in this
paper focuses mainly on these three political variables.
9Kneebone & MacKenzie (2001: 753)
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3 Empirics
3.1 Data and dependent variables
Yearly data on the budget for all 50 states in the U.S. and on governors’
party affiliations as well as the states’ legislatures has been compiled from
fiscal 1987 onwards.10 As there are good theoretical reasons to suspect that
policies will differ not only between parties, but also under unified and di-
vided government, a variable containing this information is included, too.11
Finally, the data set also contains dummy variables indicating (binding) gu-
bernatorial term limits and the fiscal years before and after a party change in
the governor’s mansion between a Republican and Democratic officeholder.
A major problem that one encounters during the analysis of revenue data
is the impact the business cycle, a subject that is too often simply glossed
over, has on tax receipts.12 For one, so-called business cycle filters, such as
the widely used Hodrick-Prescott filter or the Baxter-King bandpass filter,
which are frequently employed in business cycle research at the national
level, cannot sensibly be used in the analysis presented here, as the time
period covered is too short, and it is also theoretically unclear whether
the filters perform well at the sub-national level. Moreover, a time-series
analysis of the general fund revenue properties makes clear little more than
the difficulty of controlling for the impact of the business cycle and trends
more generally via including lagged variables when the dependent variable
is in levels.
I employ three different specifications of the dependent variable in my
analysis. The first two feature a dependent variable that is expressed in
levels, while the third one captures changes in levels. The former setups
echo common practices in the literature on state-level fiscal policy, and I
10Budget data is taken from NASBO (yearly). Per-capita state income data is taken
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The Political and demographic variables are com-
piled from the Statistical Abstract of the United States (various years), the CQ’s State Fact
Finder (various years), and the websites of the National Conference of State Legislatures
(www.ncsl.org) and the NGO U.S. Term Limits (www.termlimits.org). All U.S. dollar
values are converted to constant 2000 U.S. dollars using Bureau of Labor Statistics data
to control for the effects of nominal price-level changes.
11See for instance the work by Alt & Lowry (1994) and Heller (1997).
12See Andrews (2005) for a detailed discussion of the interplay between cross-section
regressions and potential problems with them when common shocks are present.
6
proceed to show that they are inadequate for the data at hand. The third
specification is the preferred one, and all substantive results that I derive
are based upon information obtained via the various models that employ a
measure of the general fund revenue’s change as the dependent variable.
The first set of models uses the level of per capita general fund revenue
in U.S. dollar amounts as the dependent variable. Using this specification,
several variables are found to be statistically significant, yet I proceed to
argue that these results are misleading, as there is a time trend in the data.
Moreover, a swing in party dominance from Democratic to Republican from
fiscal 1996 onwards proves problematic in this context, too.
Next, a set of regressions that rely on a “burden” measure for the general
fund revenue level is performed. It expresses the per capita general fund
revenue levels in a given state as a fraction of per capita state income. To
take a very simple example, consider a state where the per capita general
fund revenue level stood at $1,000, while income per capita was $20,000 on
average. The burden would then simply be 5%. Yet, just like in the case of
using the U.S. dollar amount of the general fund revenue as the dependent
variable, I show that the time series of the burden level is integrated of order
2 and exhibits a positive time trend that leads to biased OLS estimates.
The final measure of state-level revenue trajectories I use as a depen-
dent variable in the econometric analysis below measures the year-over-year
change of the burden level. In order to treat increases and decreases symmet-
rically, I compute the yearly change as a function of the natural logarithm of
the burden, i.e., change = ln(burdent) − ln(burdent−1). After this adjust-
ment, away from levels and towards changes, the aggregated series for the
years 1989–2004 is stationary, as indicated by an Augmented Dickey-Fuller
(ADF) test.
3.2 Summary statistics and first OLS results
All in all, budget data and information on other economic and political
variables has been collected for a panel of all 50 U.S. states for the fiscal
years 1987 to 2004, resulting in 900 complete observations.13 The 33 ob-
13Note that a fiscal year is named after the calendar year in which it ends. The federal
fiscal year 2005, for instance, began on October 1, 2004, and ended on September 30,
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Table 1
Summary statistics for state-level political and economic data
Democratic Republican Sum
Governors’ party affiliation 373 428 801
(46.4%) (53.4%) (100%)
Unified government 177 149 326
(22.1%) (18.6%) (40.7%)
Binding term limit 83 104 187
(10.4%) (13.0%) (23.3%)
Average per capita income $25,192
Average per capita revenue level $1,457
Average burden 5.74%
Note: Percentage figures may not add up exactly due to rounding.
servations where the governor was neither a member of the Democratic nor
the Republican Party were excluded, as were all 17 observations where the
year-over-year change in general fund revenues exceeded 25 percent.14 In
addition, the data for the year 1987 cannot be used in the analysis, as it is
needed to initiate the change rate computation. In the end, even after all
adjustments, 801 observations remain and form the basis for the analysis.
Table 1 reports the key summary statistics.
All regression results reported in this paper make heavy use of quali-
tative regressors to ensure that the variables that have theoretically been
identified as potentially relevant are all included in the regression models at
some point.15 Table 2 presents information on the influence of party affil-
iation, binding term limits, and unified government for the three different
specifications of the dependent variable discussed above.
Interestingly, while in models 1 and 2 several variables are reported as
statistically significant, in the last set of results no variable is statistically
significant at conventional levels, i.e., at the 95% level or above. In what
follows, I argue that only model 3’s results are valid, while the estimates
2005. Information on fiscal year start and end dates, which vary between states, can be
found in compact form in ACIR (1995: 4–5, table 2).
14These changes often reflect one-time events, such as new revenue sharing agreements
between state and local governments.
15See Gujarati (2003), chapter 9, on this approach.
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Table 2
OLS regression results for basic political variables
Independent variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Republican governor 97.47 0.0039 −0.0012
(69.71) (0.0021) (0.0062)
Republican governor with −44.14 −0.0026 0.0062
binding term limit (50.38) (0.0014) (0.0055)
Democratic governor with 125.23 0.0005 −0.0039
binding term limit (76.38) (0.0025) (0.0067)
Unified Republican −195.69** −0.0079** −0.0028
government (49.34) (0.0014) (0.0052)
Unified Democratic 15.43 0.0049* 0.0115
government (64.05) (0.0021) (0.0062)
Intercept 1430.30** 0.0560** −0.0052
(56.35) (0.0018) (0.0051)
Baseline: Democratic governor without term limit and with divided government.
Dependent variable: model 1 = revenue level, model 2 = burden level, model 3 = change
ln(burden). Heteroscedasticity-adjusted standard errors are shown in parentheses. Levels
of statistical significance are denoted as follows: ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01. N = 801.
for models 1 and 2 are plagued by biases arising from the presence of time
trends in the data and thus cannot serve as a sound basis for inference.
3.3 Examination of the data in levels
The first step here is to examine the data with the general fund revenue
level as the dependent variable. This is the simplest possible setup and will
serve as the starting point for my analysis.
The first regression I consider includes three dummy variables as the
independent variables, namely one indicating a Republican governor faced
with a non-Republican legislature, i.e., divided government, and two vari-
ables indicating a Democratic governor faced with unified or divided gov-
ernment. In this case, the intercept will show the expected average effect a
unified Republican government has on the dependent variable. The results
of this regression are reported in table 3 (model 4).
The regression results from model 4 suggest that, when compared to the
baseline category unified Republican government, states with Democratic
governments witness higher levels of general fund revenues, as do states
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Table 3
OLS regression results for the general fund revenue level specification (I)
Independent variable Model 4 Model 5
Democrat, unified 156.34* −40.62
government (65.11) (56.27)
Democrat, divided 134.69* −62.27
government (63.65) (54.58)
Republican, unified — −196.96**
government (59.42)




Benchmark Republican governor, Republican governor,
unified government divided government
dependent variable: general fund revenue level per capita
Note: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. N = 801.
Levels of statistical significance are denoted as follows: ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01.
with a Republican governor but a non-Republican legislature. Notably, as
table 3 also shows (model 5), we do not on average expect a statistically
significant difference in the general fund revenue levels between states ruled
by Democratic governors and those that have a Republican governor but
a non-Republican legislature.16 In addition, the signs of the coefficients
for Democratic states are negative, contrary to the theoretical expectations
derived from a partisan model.
So far, the reports in table 3 do not account for the revenue structure
that might be idiosyncratic to a given state. This problem is addressed
in a first shot in table 4, which reports the regression results for a set of
dummy variables that indicate whether there has been a transition between
the parties in the governor’s mansion or not. The partisan model leads
one to expect that after the governing party has changed, there should be
pronounced changes in a state’s general fund revenue levels. However, as
16Note that the results of models 4 and 5 match exactly, as they must by definition.
The information is restated in order to facilitate the understanding of the findings and to
highlight the similarities between Democratic states and those with a Republican governor
faced with divided government.
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Table 4
OLS regression results for the general fund revenue level specification (II)
Independent variable Model 6 Model 7
Democratic governor — 0.86
(50.39)
Republican governor −31.73 —
(51.91)
Switch to Democratic governor — −29.24
(Year 1) (105.01)
Switch to Democratic governor — 50.73
(Year 2+) (57.69)
Switch to Republican governor −61.13 —
(Year 1) (104.20)




dependent variable: general fund revenue level per capita
Note: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. N = 801.
Levels of statistical significance are denoted as follows: ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01.
the regression results for this specification show, no such pattern is found
in the data. In fact, the coefficients are not only statistically insignificant
at all conventional levels, but also have the same signs for both parties. In
model 6, states with Democratic governors serve as the baseline category,
while in model 7 those with Republican ones do.
A likely explanation for the rather strange pattern visible in table 4 is
the fact that the general fund revenue data exhibits a notable time trend.
Figure 1 shows the trajectory of revenues from 1988 to 2004 and a ten-year
forecast.17
Some notes on the time-series analysis are in order here: Only differ-
encing twice gives us a stationary series, as the Augmented Dickey-Fuller
test shows. The plots of the auto-correlation function (ACF) and partial
auto-correlation function (PACF) hint at an autoregressive process, as the
ACF does not end abruptly at some point, while the PACF does not dampen
down, either. As the Akaike information criterion (AIC) indeed reaches its
17The aggregate data is obtained by adding up the real per capita revenue for all 50
states for every year in the sample, thus eliminating the effect of population growth.
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lowest value for an ARIMA(2,2,0) specification, it is used as the basis for
the forecast for the years 2005–2014.
Diagnostics for the ARIMA(2,2,0) specification confirm its econometric
appropriateness, yet it quickly becomes clear how woefully inadequate this
specification appears to be substantively. The long-witnessed trend of in-
creasing per capita state revenue levels would be broken if we believed the
forecast to be accurate, an unlikely, even though not impossible result.18
























Actual and projected level of aggregated general fund revenues
Note: Forecast is based upon an ARIMA(2,2,0) process.
Given the well-known econometric problems that a time trend causes
(Phillips 2003), the simple explanation for the pattern visible in table 4
is that later years in the sample on average witnessed higher general fund
revenues than earlier ones. Under these circumstances, using an OLS frame-
work will produce biased estimates of the coefficients, exactly what can be
seen in models 6 and 7.
18The dotted lines in figure 1 show the confidence interval for ±2 standard errors. Lowry













































Composition of state governorships, 1988–2004
To compound the problems with using the level of general fund revenue
as the dependent variable, there is also a marked downward trend in the
share of states with Democratic governors in the second half of the time-
period under study. Figure 2 shows the share of Democratic and Republican
governorships in the sample for the fiscal years 1988 to 2004, and a near-
reversal in the party composition from fiscal 1996 onwards is visible. Taken
together with the time series analysis, this pattern renders any statistical
analysis of levels highly suspect and points towards the conclusion that the
effects reported in tables 3 and 4 might simply be statistical artifacts.
Despite the obvious inadequateness—given the data at hand—of a de-
pendent variable that is expressed in levels, the tables 5 and 6 report regres-
sion results for setups equivalent to those underlying tables 3 and 4. The
only change is that the dependent variable now is the relative tax burden,
which is simply the fraction of per capita general fund revenue relative to
per capita state income.
Some descriptive statistics are interesting in this context, too. On aver-
age, the burden level rose from 5.40% to 5.64% (+0.24 percentage points) in
the first year after a transition to a Democratic governor, while it also rose,
13
Table 5
OLS regression results for the general fund revenue burden specification (I)
Independent variable Model 8 Model 9
Democrat, unified 0.0097** 0.0018
government (0.0019) (0.0017)
Democrat, divided 0.0048* −0.0032*
government (0.0019) (0.0016)
Republican, unified — −0.0080**
government (0.0018)




Benchmark Republican governor, Republican governor,
unified government divided government
dependent variable: general fund revenue burden per capita
Note: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. N = 801.
Levels of statistical significance are denoted as follows: ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01.
albeit a little less, from 5.44% to 5.49% (+0.05 percentage points) after a
transition to a Republican governor. Note that the partisan difference in
the first year after a switch is equal to just 0.19 percentage points.
It should also be pointed out that the average burden was 5.83% pre-1996
in states with Democratic governors and rose to 5.86% post-1995 (+0.03 per-
centage points), while the average burden for states with Republican gov-
ernors was 5.72% pre-1996 vs. 5.75% post-1995 (+0.03 percentage points).
Note that the difference in burden levels between states with Democratic
governors vs. those with Republican ones widened slightly from 0.1077 to
0.1083 percentage points from the earlier to the later period (+0.0006 per-
centage points), yet this can hardly be interpreted as evidence in favor of the
partisan policy view, as from fiscal 1995 to fiscal 1996 the share of Demo-
cratic governors in the sample fell from 62.5% (30 out of 48) to 39.6% (19
out of 48), so that a more pronounced divergence should have ensued.
Once more, the above results have to be interpreted with considerable
caution. As an ADF test shows, the aggregated time series for the general
fund revenue burden is not stationary, suggesting biased OLS results yet
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Table 6
OLS regression results for the general fund revenue burden specification (II)
Independent variable Model 10 Model 11
Switch to Democratic governor — −0.0001
(Year 1) (0.0031)
Switch to Democratic governor — 0.0034
(Year 2+) (0.0017)
Democratic governor, no switch — 0.0013
(0.0015)
Switch to Republican governor −0.0036 —
(Year 1) (0.0031)
Switch to Republican governor −0.0040** —
(Year 2+) (0.0015)






dependent variable: general fund revenue burden per capita
Note: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. N = 801.
Levels of statistical significance are denoted as follows: ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01.
again and potentially “explaining” the increase in burden levels that the
descriptive statistics showed for after-transition changes. Curiously, even
differencing the series up to seven times does not induce stationarity ac-
cording to the ADF test. As the alternative Philipps-Perron unit root test
indicates that the series is stationary after differencing twice, however, I
follow this result and in figure 3 plot a forecast based on the model with
the lowest AIC value, namely an ARIMA(0,2,1) specification, to assess the
specification’s substantive plausibility. While the forecast is overall not im-
plausible on average, it becomes clear from the graph that there is a slight
upward trend in burden levels when the ARIMA(0,2,1) specification is used,
giving rise to biased OLS estimates and undermining the validity of the
tables 5 and 6.
15






















Time-series analysis of the aggregated general fund revenue burden
Note: Forecast is based upon an ARIMA(0,2,1) process.
4 Examination of the data in changes and results
Unlike in the two cases discussed so far, the third specification of the de-
pendent variable is not plagued by econometric complications arising from
the presence of a time trend, as indicated by an ADF test. Figure 4 shows
the new series, where the yearly change in the burden is set to the average
of all 50 states’ changes in that year. One should keep in mind that in
the econometric analysis below, no such averaging takes place and that the
results presented are therefore not influenced by any averaging.
One problem when examining this data is that there are often no strong
theoretical priors that could guide the analysis. Consider, for instance, the
effect a term limit might have on an incumbent’s behavior. As she cannot
be re-elected, she might decide to implement her preferred policy in her
last term in office. In her first term in office, however, she might not feel
16















Average change in the level of ln(general fund revenue burden)
so uninhibited, as she cannot disregard the electorate’s wishes too much if
she plans on standing for re-election. Conversely, she might want to change
revenue levels most when coming into office in order to signal her type to
voters, especially if there has been a switch in ruling parties, and there is
simply no need for vigorous action in her second term as revenue levels
are already in line with her preferences. Indeed, there are good theoretical
reasons to suspect either a move towards higher or lower revenue levels for
all the political variables safe party affiliation, so ultimately the empirical
results have to settle the question which of the countervailing effects prevail.
Despite the weak guidance that theoretical considerations provide us
with, one can identify some cases where partisan influences should be par-
ticularly pronounced. First, when a Republican governor is succeeded by
a Democrat, revenue levels should subsequently increase. Likewise, when a
Democrat is succeeded by a Republican, revenue levels should fall. These ex-
pectations could be moderated by the effects of divided government, though,
17
so that we might expect the most pronounced revenue level increases when
there is a switch to a Democratic governor who is faced with a Democratic
legislature, while revenue levels should fall most after a switch to a Re-
publican governor who is backed by a Republican legislature. There are
some arguments regarding the impact of unified vs. divided government
that point in the opposite direction, however, so the possibility that the
strongest effects ensue when governors are faced with divided government
is also examined. The rationale behind this approach is that voters will
generally find it easier to attribute blame for unpopular policies to a specific
party under unified government, which might attenuate the fervor of the
governors and legislatures when it comes to implementing their preferred
policies under such circumstances.19
• Term limits
Based upon the relevant literature on state-level fiscal policy, I perform a
first regression analysis that sheds light on the behavior of governors who
are faced with a term limit. Given the uncertainty about the effect of term
limits, I do not have any theoretical priors regarding the signs of the regres-
sion coefficients. The results of the analysis of the impact of term limits
are presented in table 7. Strikingly, not a single coefficient reported there is
statistically significant at the 95% level, and I thus conclude that the pres-
ence or absence of term limits does not exert any systematic influence on
state-level general fund revenues.
• Divided vs. unified government
Next, I examine the effect that divided vs. unified government has on state-
level fiscal policy. The results obtained by running this regression are shown
in table 8. In contrast to the regression results for the impact of term limits,
there are several coefficients that are statistically significant in this case.
Yet, in substantive terms, the burden difference between a state that has
a unified Democratic government and one that is under Republican control
amounts to only 1.3% of 5.74% (model 16). Put differently, we expect the
burden to differ on average by $18.92 between the two setups. As a fraction





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































of average per capita GDP, this partisan difference translates into 0.075%.20
To ensure that the results obtained for the full sample are not driven
by unusually large swings in single years, an analysis of three ten-year sub-
samples, spanning the years 1988–1997, 1991–2000, and 1994–2003, was
performed, too.21 An analysis of the first subperiod does not yield a single
statistically significant coefficient at the 95% level, even though the ones that
are significant at the 95% level in table 8 are all significant at the 90% level,
with their size very close to what is reported in table 8. For subsample 2,
spanning the years 1991 to 2000, again not a single coefficient is statistically
significant in the analysis, and the t-values drop across the board. Finally,
in the third subsample, for the years 1994 to 2003, only the intercepts in
models 16 and 17 are statistically significant at the 95% level. In the case of
model 16, a unified Republican government is expected to on average lower
general fund revenue levels by 1.41%, or $21.66, vs. all other constellations,
while model 17 predicts that a Republican governor operating under divided
government will on average lower the revenue level by 0.7917%, or $12.18,
when compared to the three other possible combinations.
• Change in the governing party
Given the null result that was found for the effect of term limits and the sub-
stantively small effects of unified vs. divided government, one major aspect
of state-level fiscal policy remains to be examined. This section studies the
behavior of Democratic governors who succeeded a Republican officeholder
and Republican governors who followed a Democrat in office. Under these
two setups, the partisan policy model strongly suggests that revenue levels
will rise in the former case and fall in the latter. Unlike in the earlier cases,
where it could potentially be argued that there was no need for adjustments,
as revenue levels might already have been at or close to the governors’ ideal
points, if no sizable adjustment effects are found here, then one has to won-
der whether the partisan model actually generates useful predictions or not.
20The estimated average difference falls to 1.01% of 5.74% for the unified Democratic
and divided Republican case (model 17), or about $14.79. Note that the estimates for
model 18 by construction match those for models 16 and 17.
21The results of these regression are only reported in summary form here. Tables with


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In order to measure the impact of a partisan change in the governor’s
mansion, I specify four models that once more rely heavily on qualitative
regressors. Given the results from table 8, I distinguish not only between
party affiliation and the time that has passed since a switch, but also be-
tween unified and divided government. The partisan policy view predicts
the strongest effects in the case of a switch to either a unified Republican
or unified Democratic government, and the adjustments that one ought to
observe after such a switch should be rather sizable.
As a look at table 9 shows, in the first year after a party change in the
governor’s mansion, Democratic officeholders faced with a likewise Demo-
cratic legislature indeed do oversee rising revenue levels (models 20 and 21).
Yet, over the longer run, i.e., when all years after a switch and before the
next change are taken into account, this effect disappears.22 Also, note that
the standard errors for the longer-run coefficients are about half the size
of the ones for the first-year effect, which is not surprising given that we
are dealing with 62 vs. 18 observations that these are based upon. Thus,
there is a “jump” upwards in the first post-election (fiscal) year, but it is a
one-time event.
Moreover, the predicted “jump” in the first year on average amounts
to 4.39% of 5.74%, or $64.02, in the most favorable case, i.e., when the
difference between the baseline category and the effect of the first-year switch
is computed for model 20. Compared to the average per capita general fund
revenue level of $5826.55 over a governor’s four-year tenure, this translates
into a partisan effect of 1.10%, or just 0.0676% of the average person’s
$94742.96 GDP over the same four-year period.
Strikingly, Republican governors appear to neither lower revenues in the
short nor in the long run when they succeed a Democrat under any constella-
tion, at least not when standard levels of statistical confidence are employed.
Given the magnitudes involved, one can hardly call the partisan effects found
here sizable, and despite the three statistically significant variables reported
22Alt & Lowry (2000) likewise find that adjustments only take place in the first two
years after a change of the ruling party, yet they still maintain that there are marked
differences in policy preferences between Democrats and Republicans. Standard regression
diagnostics, including checks for influential observations, were performed for all models,
but did not indicate any serious problems.
22
in table 9, not much of substantive significance can be discerned from this
set of regressions, either.
As a further robustness check, I estimated the (potential) breakpoints of
the aggregated time series shown in figure 4. As figure 2 above shows, there
was a pronounced change in party composition at the levels of the U.S. states
from fiscal 1996 onwards. In fiscal 1995, 30 of the 48 states in the sample were
governed by a Democrat, while 18 had Republican governors. In fiscal 1996,
however, this relationship had been almost reversed, and only 19 states still
had Democratic governors (−36.67%), whereas the Republicans recorded a
large gain of 11 governorships for a total of 29 (+61.11%). Overall, if the
partisan policy theory is accurate, one would expect a break in the general
fund revenue time series at the end of fiscal 1995. Yet, as a structural break
computation shows, the (statistically) most notable break present in the
data is found at the end of fiscal 1997, i.e., at a time when there was no
change in the number of Republican governors at all (31 in both 1997 and
1998), while the number of Democratic governorships in the sample fell by
just 1 (from 17 to 16).23 In fact, the six largest trend breaks are identified
at the end of the fiscal years 1990, 1992, 1994, 1997, 2000, and 2002. Note
that the year 1995 is conspicuously absent from this list.
Overall, this finding is in line with the regression results presented in ta-
ble 9, which show that Republican governors who succeed Democrats simply
“sit tight,” i.e., they do not oversee lower revenue levels than their prede-
cessors. In particular, the trend break analysis does not show any break
between fiscal 1995 and fiscal 1996, which indicates that the newly elected
Republicans simply continued the policies of their Democratic colleagues.
23The trend break estimation was performed in R 2.1.0 using the command breakpoints()
from the strucchange package. Enders (2004: 200-207) presents a compact overview of
how to identify structural changes in time series, while Bai & Perron (2003) discuss the






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5 Discussion and implications
Given the results reported in section 4, the notion that governors’ policies
follow partisan patterns with regard to revenue levels can only be upheld
with considerable qualifications based on state-level revenue data for the
fiscal years 1988 to 2004. The effects found have a one-shot character and
are at best on the order of 5 percent of the average general fund revenue level,
which translates into about 0.068% of the average person’s $94,742.96 GDP
over a four-year period. What explains the complete absence of partisan
effects when it comes to members of the Republican party and the only
minuscule adjustments that Democrats make to the general fund revenue
level despite the appealing logic of the partisan policy model remains an
open question, however. Likewise, the discrepancy between the findings of
this paper and earlier work discussed in section 2, most notably the papers by
Alt & Lowry (2000) and Besley & Case (1995), is a bit puzzling. Especially
the claim by Alt and Lowry that Democrats strive for 50% higher revenue
levels than Republicans is cast into serious doubt in light of my findings.24
The pattern that Democratic governors raise taxes during their “lame
duck” term reported by Besley & Case (1995) is not echoed here, either. In-
deed, term limits could not be shown to exert statistically significant effects
on the general fund revenue level. How much of the divergence between their
results and mine are attributable to different time periods covered cannot be
ascertained with certainty, but it seems unlikely that this is the main cause
for the contrasting results. Indeed, it appears more likely that the insuf-
ficient regard earlier papers, including theirs, paid to nationwide economic
trends lies at the heart of this difference.25
24In order for revenue levels to rise by 50% from the status quo, there would have to
be 10 transitions from Republican control of a state’s governorship to unified Democratic
control, which translates into a time-span of at least 76 years. One should keep in mind
that revenue levels are never predicted to fall, so a downward (Republican) adjustment
is ruled out here. 10 transitions would be needed to induce a 50% difference in revenue
levels because (1.043938)10 = 1.537259.
25Besley & Case (1995), for example, simply include year dummies in their time-series
cross-section regressions, which is an inappropriate way of dealing with a unit root. To my
knowledge, the only paper published in a political science journal thus far that at length
discusses unit roots in the context of fiscal policy, albeit at the federal level, is Krause
(2000).
25
One possible explanation for the absence of evidence pointing towards
substantially meaningful partisan revenue effects is the fact that the mobility
of both labor and capital is high within the U.S. Once a state’s tax rates get
too much out of line with those in neighboring areas, either an outflux of
capital and labor under relatively rising rates or an influx under relatively
falling rates should largely offset the revenue effects of most tax changes. In
this sense, tax manipulation should at least not shine through in the revenue
data over the longer run. A better approach to testing the partisan policy
theory using state-level data might thus be to examine the impact of changes
in the tax levels directly, yet reliable impact forecasts for such changes are
notoriously hard to come by.
Overall, the result presented here notwithstanding, it is entirely possible
that the partisan policy logic applies in settings where mobility is relatively
low, i.e, at the national level. Whether patterns similar to the ones found
for the state-level can be found at the local level in the U.S., too, is yet
another open question and a potentially fruitful avenue for future research.
26
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